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Abstract: To avoid delays arising from a need to decrypt a video prior to transcoding and then re-encrypt it afterwards, this paper 
assesses a selective encryption (SE) content protection scheme. The scheme is suited to both recent standardized codecs, namely 
H.264/Advanced Video Coding (AVC) and High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC). Specifically, the paper outlines a joint crypto-
transcoding scheme for secure transrating of a video bitstream. That is to say it generates new video bitrates, possibly as part of an 
HTTP Adaptive Streaming (HAS) content delivery network. The scheme will reduce the bitrate to one or more lower desired bit-
rate without consuming time in the encryption/decryption process, which would be the case when full encryption is used. In 
addition, the decryption key no longer needs to be exposed at intermediate middleboxes, including when transrating is performed 
in a cloud datacenter. The effectiveness of the scheme is variously evaluated: by examination of the SE generated visual distortion; 
by the extent of computational and bitrate overheads; and by choice of cipher when encrypting the selected elements within the 
bitstream. Results indicate that there remains: a content; quantization level (after transrating of an encrypted video); and codec-
type dependency to any distortion introduced. A further recommendation is that the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is 
preferred for SE to lightweight XOR encryption, despite it being taken up elsewhere as a real-time encryption method. 
Keywords Content protection; H.264/AVC; HEVC; selective encryption; transcoding; transrating; video streaming 
1 Introduction 
Video content can be streamed to a device for viewing without the need for other than partial storage on the device, though the 
video stream is stored on a server and possibly encrypted as well. For example, using the most mature form [1] of HTTP Adaptive 
Streaming (HAS), that is HTTP Live Streaming (HLS), a client device can dynamically select from different representations of the 
stream according to available bandwidth. Each of these versions might be first transcoded [2] to one of (say) eight versions, with 
a ninth audio stream. Transcoding might be through changing the spatial resolution, the temporal resolution, or the bitrate, which 
in effect involves a reduction in the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR), which is commonly interpreted as a reduction in video quality. 
This paper assesses the effectiveness of changing the bitrate, i.e. transrating, when that bitstream is encrypted. Transcoding may 
also involve changing the video format, for example between that of one codec to another, though this is usually not required for 
HAS and is not assessed herein. Prior to transcoding for HLS, the original video stream might be delivered to a Content Delivery 
Network (CDN) by Real-Time Messaging Protocol (RTMP). Such a CDN, might be part of a CDN as a Service (CDNaaS) [3] 
cloud-based offering. As remote processing is involved, additional security issues arise if content is not protected. Unfortunately, 
content protection through encryption results in additional latency at intermediate transcoders due to the need for decryption. The 
aim of this paper is to avoid that additional latency by allowing the video to be transcoded without decryption taking place. At the 
same time, the paper seeks to establish whether accelerated forms of encryption/decryption can further reduce the latency, without 
significantly affecting the content’s security. This is a timely study, given the increased prevalence of transcoding in the mobile 
Internet, which was not around when transcoding was originally applied to statistical multiplexing of broadcast video. 
Encryption allows protection of content against illegal access to a video server and also protects each video stream during 
transport across the Internet. Content protection is deemed necessary to ensure the commercial viability of a video streaming 
service because otherwise there would be no monetary incentive to make videos and distribute them. For example, the HLS 
specification [4] supports full encryption of video segments within a representation using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
key length 128 and the Encrypted Media Extensions (EME) W3C specification describes key management for HTML5 video [5]. 
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RTMPE also supports full encryption through the Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) stream cipher. As RC4 is now considered 
cryptographically insecure by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [6] and, as a result, is not included in browsers such as 
Internet Explorer 11, alternatively, the RTMP video stream can be wrapped within a Transport Layer Security (TLS) session. 
However, these forms of full encryption are sometimes called naïve encryption because they do not exploit the features of video, 
essentially treating it as text. Consequently, it may result in a significant performance overhead, especially if software-only 
encryption occurs [7]. 
However, compared to full encryption, with selective encryption (SE) [8] not only is the amount of data encrypted reduced but 
some forms of SE are decoder format-compatible. If the form of SE is not format compatible, as occurred in [9] for the I-frame 
encryption option, then the transcoder has to be modified. As transcoder modification reduces the generality of the solution, 
requiring all transcoders to be modified, this paper only considers decoder compatible forms of SE. A similar observation applies 
to secured hardware transcoders such as that of the Secure Video Processor (SVP) alliance [10], which may also be costly compared 
to an unsecured transcoder. Thus, it is possible to ensure the video is unwatchable owing to distortions, while at the same time 
permit bitrate transcoding without decryption. For example, in the RTMP delivery of the original video to a CDNaaS, were SE to 
be employed, there would be no intermediate storage of the decryption key, which is only held by the client device. As previously 
mentioned, the client device also does not store a streamed video, unless deserialization software has illicitly been installed. In 
addition, the selectively encrypted components can be encrypted by a standardized cipher such as AES operating in a streaming 
mode such as Cipher Feedback (CFB). After encryption, those encrypted components are normally replaced in the video bitstream 
in the interests of format compatibility. 
Apart from its use in HAS, video content can be further compressed by transcoding to reduce the bit-rate of the video in order 
to match the capability of a user’s device, such as its processing capacity, which will affect the viable display frame rate. Spatial 
resolution is the other main factor that can reduce the bitrate of the original video content. The resolution of a user’s device may 
be as low as Common Intermediate Format (CIF), as high as 1280 × 720 pixels/frame (High Definition or HD), or even Ultra HD 
(UHD) resolution [11]. However, though spatial resolution switching does occur in HAS systems, in [12] it was recommended that 
the spatial resolution of the target device is first adjusted for, after which different quality representations are selected by a client 
device. In [13], quality switching through encoding was found to be the most common form of representation considered in 
research. Thus, this paper considers quality transcoding, especially as temporal switching, though effective in terms of the resulting 
Quality-of-Experience (QoE) has limited impact on the bitrate [12]. 
Transcoder banks are now common as intermediate devices sitting between mobile devices of various types, such as 
smartphones, tablets. They provide a way of mediating between high-quality source video, typically held at a server, and the 
processing capability of the target device, along with any bitrate restrictions on the network path to the device. Should these 
transcoders or other intermediate devices need to decrypt the video stream then the decryption key is exposed. There is also a key 
management overhead involved in supplying the key to any intermediate devices, not only to transcoders but devices that might 
insert logos or watermarks. Another application could be through video transcoding at a satellite and additionally video transcoding 
already takes place as part of the broadcast statistical multiplexing process  
Transcoding of the quality level is also common in digital TV broadcast systems for the purpose of statistical multiplexing TV 
programs onto the transmission channel. Larger values of the Quantization Parameter (QP) produce a more compressed version of 
the original video, so that increasing the QP through transcoding can additionally support a ‘pay-per-quality’ service, as originally 
described in [14]. Of course, the original compressed video must be encoded with a low QP or high quality, as it is impossible to 
increase the quality of a video through transcoding. However, for any such ‘pay-per-quality’ scheme, content protection through 
encryption is required. Because such a scheme requires decryption before and re-encryption after transcoding, the complexity and 
transcoding latency will be increased [15]. In this paper, we present a way of transcoding with selective content encryption which 
aims to reduce those overheads. One should also remark that in the video plus depth 3D video format [16], the depth information 
is stored as a conventional video, in addition to the normal 2D video. Therefore, the same method of crypto-transcoding could be 
applied to the depth video stream in the video plus depth format. 
Raw video in YUV format is encoded (compressed) prior to encryption. Fig. 1 shows a classical transcoding system, in which 
the video is fully decrypted before altering the QP and re-encrypting.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Classical transcoding system 
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Though a number of transcoder designs [17] have sought to transcode without fully decoding the video, in order to decrease 
latency, some of these designs are vulnerable in one way or another to temporal error drift due to lack of synchronization between 
the original encoder and the remote decoder. In open-loop transcoder designs, because no reference is made to the frame store 
before re-quantization or transform coefficient pruning, temporal error drift builds up across a Group-of-Pictures (GoP), even 
though processing time is reduced. Closed-loop designs seek to approximate the cascaded architecture of Fig. 1 by reintroducing 
the transform stage; however, though drift is minimized, extra processing latency is re-introduced.  Instead, the proposed crypto-
transcoder, while avoiding temporal error drift, reduces the time previously taken-up by encryption and decryption.  As a result, 
all processing takes place within the same transcoder block.  Apart from reducing processing latency, decrypted video content is 
no longer exposed to other intermediate devices during a video stream’s journey across the Internet. As the focus of this work is 
on encryption overhead rather than transcoder architectures, the use of alternative transcoder architectures will be the subject of 
future research. The need for the proposed scheme has increased. Since 2011, according to [18], the personalization phase of video 
delivery has occurred, by which cloud storage and cloud-based streaming of cached video [19] has become common after suitable 
representations have been generated by means of transcoder banks. Storage on local video servers in a way is even more vulnerable 
because professional security management may not be available, implying that encryption is also needed for non-cloud storage.  
The key factor of the transcoding system represented in Fig. 1 is that there is a need to decrypt the video before transcoding is 
started and after transcoding to re-encode before performing re-encryption. As previously mentioned, in Fig. 1’s classical system, 
there is a need to expose the video content during transcoding and the decryption keys are also exposed at the transcoder, as 
otherwise decoding will fail. In contrast to the classical system of Fig. 1, the crypto-transcoding scheme in this paper has the 
following research contributions to traditional secure transcoders: 
 
1. The scheme presented in this paper employs a selective-encryption method that works only on uniformly-distributed 
selected syntax elements of the compressed video stream. Owing to this strategy, a selectively-encrypted video stream is 
decoder compliant, which means that, despite encryption, the video stream can be transcoded. As a result, there is no need 
to decrypt and then re-encrypt at the transcoder site.  
2. The process of changing the QP otherwise works exactly as before. Finally, the decryption procedure is always performed 
by a target device and not at any intermediate point, where the content and/or decryption keys may be exposed.  
3. SE is applied at the entropy-coding stage of the encoder as a crypto-compression scheme, so that there is limited additional 
computational overhead from the encryption process. 
4. Choosing SE rather than full encryption runs a risk that content may not be sufficiently distorted and, so in some way, 
expose the video content any way without the need for decryption. Thus, an additional, significant contribution of this 
paper is to assess the effectiveness of the format compatible and compression-friendly approach to encryption for secure 
transcoding. The structural distortion analysis of crypto-transrated videos is done through the objective quality metrics in 
the experiments.   
5. For experiments, we have conducted estimates of: the computation involved, the file sizes, and the effect, as part of the 
selective encryption process, of choosing various syntax elements of a Context Adaptive Binary Arithmetic Coding 
(CABAC) entropy coder [20]. A part of that evaluation process was the performance of the H.264/Advanced Video Coding 
(AVC) standard [20] and the more recently standardized High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC) codec [21]. The intention 
was not to compare their relative compression performance, which has already been extensively explored. However, much 
legacy video content remains in H.264/AVC format or even in MPEG-2 codec format. However, it is possible to use format 
transcoding between MPEG-2 to H.264/AVC coding [22]. Therefore, an important part of this paper’s contribution is the 
implementation of the proposed scheme over both more recent standardized codecs under transcoding.  
6. Usually encryption in the context of transcoders is performed through a full-strength cipher, often the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) cipher, before appropriate replacement in the compressed video stream. Despite its security strength, the 
AES has complex rounds, which take up much computation. In this paper, two ciphers are tested for crypto-transcoding 
through selected entropy-coder syntax elements. In experiments, an Exclusive OR (XOR) cipher is tested for both the 
H.264/AVC and HEVC encoder and then the AES cipher is also utilized in a stream cipher mode over the HEVC encoder. 
For speed, it is possible that the XOR cipher might be used for that purpose, if the security can be enhanced by means of 
One Time Pad (OTP) session keys. The current paper, therefore, also considers that alternative too.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2, describes the process of the SE used in this paper, the available 
transcoder architectures, and other background necessary for an understanding of the paper. Section 3 is a review of related work 
research in the domain of secure transcoding for HEVC. Then Section 4 outlines the evaluation methodology employed. 
Subsequently Section 5, considers the effectiveness of crypto-transcoding through experiments to determine the combined effect 
of SE and transrating according to the visual effect or distortion and the computational and bit-rate overheads, when using either 
of the two standard codecs. Results taken with two ciphers are also included. A comparative analysis of previous schemes and the 
current one is also included. Finally, Section 6 draws some conclusions concerning this research.  
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2 Background 
 
 
This Section provides basic brief introductions to the main components of the scheme. It is not intended to be a comprehensive 
or full description of these components. In particular, the following Section describes the SE method used in this paper. 
2.1 Selective encryption 
Chaotic-map based full encryption does not have the performance penalties of the naïve encryption schemes described in Section 
1. However, if encryption occurs before transcoding takes place, the video must first be decrypted prior to processing, which 
implies that the decryption key is also exposed at a CDN server. As in the future CDN servers may be placed remotely on a cloud, 
there is a risk from third-party contractors, who may operate in data-centers outside the legal jurisdiction of the content owner. For 
live video processing or interactive video processing, the need to decrypt and then re-encrypt will cause a significant delay if full 
encryption is employed. It is also no longer possible to perform intermediate video processing of video chunks if full encryption 
has been performed. For example, it is no longer possible to insert logos or watermarks without first decrypting the video stream. 
 
The XOR is widely used in chaotic schemes by the researchers. An interesting study is [23], which considers the use of XOR 
encryption both in chaotic stream ciphers and two other schemes. Chaotic encryption is designed to avoid the computational 
overhead of full encryption with a block-based cipher but as the authors of [23] indicate, it has shortcomings if XOR encryption is 
employed. However, unlike the current paper, SE is not considered. In [24] there is a comparison between: 1) an SE scheme using 
AES encryption; 2) an SE scheme using AES to generate pseudo-random numbers prior to XOR encryption; and 3) an SE scheme 
based on chaotic generation of a random stream of numbers prior to XOR encryption. The latter is shown to improve considerably 
in terms of processing time compared to option 2). However, the originators of scheme 3) do not consider the impact of intermediate 
transcoding. 
Instead, Selective Encryption (SE) [25], as used herein, provides a lightweight procedure for video content confidentiality, as 
it does not encrypt all video data but selects the most influential or most important syntax elements from the multimedia content 
(herein video) and then encrypts those elements. Because of the reduction of encrypted material, SE reduce computational overhead 
compared to full (or its subset naïve) encryption. Thus, this approach lends itself to real-time or interactive applications of video 
streaming such as video phone, video conferencing, and telemedicine. However, not all types of SE provide efficient or sufficient 
content protection. Some SE algorithms exhibit weaknesses in terms of: an additional bit-rate overhead; lack of decoder 
compliance; and insufficient confidentiality. Nonetheless, these weaknesses can be addressed by ensuring that SE is performed at 
the final stage of a hybrid video encoder [26] i.e. entropy-coding stage, and after ensuring that statistical distribution of encrypted 
syntax elements will not be altered [27]. Only then does SE become beneficial as no or limited extra bit-rate overhead occurs. 
Notice also that in [28] the resilience of the SE scheme in this paper has already been checked and analysed in respect to a variety 
of attacks. 
The SE utilized in this paper works at the Context Adaptive Binary Arithmetic Coding (CABAC) form (entropy coding) so that 
the SE scheme can apply both to the H.264/AVC codec and to HEVC. Notice that, though there are some differences in the way 
CABAC is performed in HEVC compared to H.264/AVC, H.264/AVC methods of SE can be adapted to those of HEVC by the 
conversion methods of [29].  The CABAC encoder works on a number of parameters which potentially could be used in the 
encryption operation, these being the Coded Block Flag; the Motion Vector Differences (MVDs); the Macroblock (MB) types; the 
Transform Coefficients (TCs); the delta quantization parameters (dQPs); and the numerical signs of TCs and MVDs. However, 
not all the syntax elements mentioned above provide decoder compliance and so in this paper we select: the signs of TCs and the 
signs of MVDs, which we abbreviate to MV signs. Due to this selection, the proposed scheme allows SE to take place without 
decryption and re-encryption when transrating takes place. One key determinant of whether a syntax element is suitable for 
selection is whether it is by-pass coded, i.e. whether or not it affects the context adaptation models. Elements, such as the above 
two, are selected because they do not affect the context models. In addition, signs can reasonably be expected to follow a Uniform 
distribution, before and after encryption. Therefore, in a long-term statistical sense there is no bitrate overhead from this type of 
SE, even though for particular video streams it may turn out that there is some overhead. 
An alternative to decoder-compatible SE exists, which might permit transcoding without prior decryption. That is video can be 
encrypted prior to compression. However, unless specialist forms of encryption are deployed, encryption removes the correlation 
that compression exploits, resulting in a loss of compression efficiency. Permutation-based forms of encryption can preserve or 
even enhance the correlation within a video frame. On the other hand, in [30], which described its proposed security as ‘reasonable’, 
the method was confined to spatial-only codecs. In fact, other encryption-then-compression schemes such as [31], though they 
offer a solution to a need for intermediate processing, including transcoding, appear confined to spatially-coded images and may 
have weak compression performance [32]. 
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2.2 Ciphers: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and real-time XOR 
 
The symmetric encryption cipher AES [33] was chosen as one encryption option for the SE elements. AES has low memory 
requirements and has been designed to guard against timing attacks. The AES structure is shown in Fig. 2. The encryption 
procedure uses a set of especially derivative keys called round keys. The following AES steps are for the encryption of a 128-bit 
block: 
1. Calculate a set of round keys from the cipher key. 
2. Arrange a state array with the plaintext block data. 
3. Add the initial round key to the preliminary state array. 
4. Execute nine rounds of state operations. 
5. Perform the tenth and last round of the state operation. 
6. Duplicate the final state array as the outputted encrypted ciphertext. 
As AES employs a single key with a limited key length, the efficiency is increased in terms of computational time, and memory 
consumption compared to asymmetric-key algorithms.  Additionally, compared to prior standardized symmetric ciphers, AES 
provides a shield against many attacks [34].   
The logical function XOR can optionally be applied as a symmetric cipher to the selected CABAC binary bins aggregated into 
128-bit blocks. Its one-step operation results in rapid encryption. However, especially if the same key is repeatedly used, the 
security is weak, being vulnerable to a known-plaintext attack by XORing the plaintext with the ciphertext to output the key. The 
cipher is also vulnerable to flipping of the cipher text so that a valid but incorrect ‘message’ is generated. This effect is termed 
malleability, when decryption takes place. However, by means of a continually changing key generated with a Pseudo-Random 
Number Generator (PRNG), the confidentiality is greatly enhanced, if the initial seed can be securely distributed and the PRNG is 
‘sufficiently random’. Another possibility is to establish a long-term AES key through the Diffie-Helman key distribution protocol 
[35]. Thereafter, a session key, possibly for each video frame depending on the level of protection required, is then AES encrypted 
and included in the header of the XOR SE file. This form of lightweight encryption is also gaining prominence in lightweight 
encryption for smart grid applications, for example [36].  
 
Add Cipher 
Key
Shift Rows
Byte 
Substitution
Mix Columns
 
Plain-text
Cipher-text
10 times 
repetition for 
128-bit key
 
Fig. 2 AES structure to encrypt 128-bit plaintext block 
2.3 Transcoding 
Video transcoding is the process of converting a compressed video from one form into another. Transcoding is performed on 
the basis of parameters such as the bitrate, frame rate, and spatial resolution. It is possible to convert from one codec standard to 
another, such as when a video encoded in a newer format, for example H.264/AVC, commonly employed for video over wireless, 
is converted to a legacy format such as MPEG-2, so that it can be broadcast over digital TV networks [37]. One of the main uses 
of transcoding continues to be reducing the bit-rate of a pre-compressed video stream according to the available channel bandwidth. 
Increasingly owing to the proliferation of networked devices, different clients may use different ways to access the Internet [38]. 
Each access network type has different channel characteristics such as bandwidths, bit rate errors and packet loss rates. At the user 
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end, different networked devices including smartphones and desktop PCs are used for browsing the Internet. All end-user devices, 
including Set-Top Boxes, vary in terms of resources such as computing power and display resolution. To deliver video streaming 
data to users connected with different types of networks and having different terminals may need to be adapted dynamically at 
intermediate locations within a network [39]. Transcoding at intermediate relays has similar security implications to that when 
transporting encrypted source video in preparation for HAS representation generation within CDNs, described in Section 1. 
Encrypted video is also transcoded at various points during in-house production of films or TV programs, when the need for 
decryption and re-encryption is a considerable problem. 
Transcoding is one way to handle and accomplish the conversion task, the other way being scalable video. However, there may 
be a bitrate overhead arising from scalable coding, though HEVC variants of SVC [40] have gone some way to address that issue 
by considering inter-layer prediction. Encryption of H.264/SVC was considered in [27]. It is also possible [41] to apply a form of 
transcoding to encrypted scalable video after packetization. This works by employing the unencrypted packet headers to guide 
truncation of the encrypted packet payload.   However, further consideration of transcoding of scalable video is beyond the scope 
of the current paper.2.4 Transcoding Architectures 
There are several types of transrating architectures [17] [42] [43]. The relative advantages/disadvantages of these architectures 
are summarized in Table 1.The decoding-encoding cascaded architecture is the classical architecture, already described in Section1.
 
Table 1. Comparison among different transcoding architectures
2.4 Standardized Video Codecs 
As mentioned in Section 1, the scheme is suitable for both current video codec standards, the H.264/AVC standard [20] and the 
HEVC codec [21], the differences between which are summarized in Table 2, which is a modified version of that in [44]. Both of 
these codecs are standardized according to the bitstream format delivered to the decoder. As such they are suitable for use in 
consumer electronics devices. The HEVC standard is specialized towards HD and even UHD resolution video. As such it has 
introduced many coding refinements to achieve the required compression ratios to accommodate video streams in those formats 
across reduced bandwidth links. Though, the compression ratio can be increased by up to 50% by means of an HEVC codec that 
advantage comes with an increase in codec complexity, which in turn increases processing latency. 
  
Parameters Cascaded Decoding-
Encoding 
Open Loop Closed Loop 
Computational cost This architecture is more costly 
in terms of computation overhead 
and processing units. 
The open loop architecture is the 
fastest and the simplest means of 
video trans-coding. 
This architecture approximates the 
cascaded decoding-encoding architecture 
by reintroducing a transform stage. 
Error signal  In an open loop architecture, the 
output is neither measured nor fed-
back for comparison with the input. 
In a closed-loop architecture, an error 
signal is fed-back to minimize the 
temporal error drift. 
Reference frames A reference frame is used to 
minimize the difference between 
the input and output frame. 
Reference frames from a frame 
buffer are not used in the processing. 
For each reference frame, feedback (the 
difference between the actual frame and 
desired frame) is used to take corrective 
action. 
Video drift A reference frame is stored in a 
decoded frame buffer, which is 
utilized properly to remove 
temporal drift. 
In this architecture temporal error 
drift is increased, particularly if high-
frequency DCT coefficients are 
removed from the residual 
information. 
Temporal drift is removed owing to the 
use of a reference frame and taking motion 
compensation as a linear function. 
DCT/IDCT Two pairs of DCT/IDCT are 
used. 
The DCT/IDCT block is not used in 
this architecture. 
A single pair of DCT/IDCT is used. 
Best usage This architecture can be used as a 
benchmark transcoder. 
Its use straightforward and works 
best for intra-coded pictures. Latency 
is minimized. 
This architecture is the best compromise 
for the video transcoding process, though 
additional latency occurs due to extra 
latency.  
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Table 2 Comparison between H. 264/AVC and HEVC standards after [44] 
Category H.264/AVC H.265/HEVC 
Names MPEG 4 or H.264/AVC (Standardized in 2003) MPEG-H, HEVC or H.265 (Accepted in Jan. 2013) 
Key 
Improvement 
 Designed to work with HD video stream 
delivery for online and Broadcast 
 40-50% reduction of the bit rate compared 
to prior standards 
 Aimed to deal with UHD, 4k, 2k for online and broadcast  
 40-50% reduction of the bit rate at the same visual quality 
matched to previous standard (H.264/AVC) 
Compression 
Model 
Hybrid spatial-temporal prediction model 
 Flexible partition of Macro Block (MB), 
sub-Macro Block for MV prediction 
 9 directional modes for intra prediction 
 16×16 maximum Macroblock structure 
 Entropy coding by CABAC or lower 
complexity Context Adaptive Variable 
Length Coding (CAVLC) 
 ½ or ¼ pixel interpolation 
Extended hybrid spatial-temporal prediction model 
 Introduced Coding Tree Units (CTUs) (Coding, Prediction and 
Transform Units (CU, PU and TU respectively) in quad-tree 
structure 
 35 directional modes for intra prediction 
 Parallel processing architecture, enhancements in multi-view 
coding extension 
 CTU supporting larger block structure (64×64 pixels) with 
more variable sub-partition structures 
 Entropy coding is only Context Adaptive Binary Arithmetic 
Coding (CABAC)  
Specification 
 Support up to 4K (4096 × 2304 
pixels/frame) 
 Supports up to 59.94 fps 
 21 profiles; 17 levels 
 Support up to 8K  UHDTV (8192 × 4320 pixels/frame) 
 Supports up to 300 fps 
 3 approved profiles, draft for additional 5; 13 levels 
Drawback 
Unrealistic for UHD content delivery owing to 
high bitrate requirements.  
Low frame rates unsuitable for higher 
resolutions.  
Computationally expensive (~300% +) due to larger PUs and 
expensive Motion Estimation (intra prediction with more modes, 
asymmetric partitions in inter prediction, 1/8th pixel interpolation) 
3 Related Work 
This Section considers the SE and possible transcoding of HEVC, as prior SE of H.264/AVC has been already considered in 
surveys such as [8] [45]. The Section additionally considers recent lightweight encryption schemes, as these have a bearing upon 
the investigation of XOR encryption of video in this paper. 
The authors of [29] discussed how their prior H.264/AVC SE scheme, applied at the entropy coding stage to CABAC binstrings, 
could be adapted to HEVC, even though a somewhat different form of element coding (truncated Rice code instead of unary code) 
is employed in HEVC. In the HEVC version also, if real-time AES encryption was to be achieved, there was a need to concatenate 
elements to be encrypted so that their concatenated length was a power of two. In the prior H.264/AVC version as in the HEVC 
version, chosen elements of CABAC binstrings were encrypted with AES in CFB mode. Principally, bits of the quantized transform 
coefficients (QTCs) and motion vector difference (MVDs) were encrypted.  By careful choice of the encrypted CABAC 
parameters, it is possible to make the bitstream format compliant with limited or no impact on the bitstream size, as context 
modelling is not affected. As encryption does not extend over HEVC’s entropy coding slices, potential parallel computing is also 
not affected. However, the method of [29] is reported by the authors to not be robust to compression domain processing, which 
includes some forms of transcoding. A minor issue that possibly could be rectified is that an update of the HEVC standard has 
meant that the method is no longer format compliant. 
Hofbauer et al. [46] investigated transparent encryption of HEVC bitstream. Transparent encryption is a form of SE in which 
the viewer is able to partially view the content with a view to encouraging purchasing of a full quality version. The method worked 
by flipping the signs of AC transform coefficients signs. The percentage of bit flipping can be varied according to the desired level 
of transparency.  Mid-range video quality, determined by QP, was evaluated. In fact, the authors conceded that the approach is 
unsuitable for high-quality video because, in this case, some blocks may not actually be transformed, resulting in no bits to flip.  
To address issues with pioneering SE of HEVC CABAC elements, in [47], a somewhat different choice of coding elements was 
chosen, namely coeff_sign_flag, mvd_sign_flag, cu_qp_delta_abs and the suffix of abs_mvd_minus2. As before these bits are extracted, 
encrypted with AES after concatenation before placing the encrypted bits back in their original positions in the HEVC output 
bitstream. Though [47] demonstrates resilience against a replacement attacks, i.e. replacing bits known to be encrypted with other 
bits, and some other threats, within [47] the few pages available did not permit a full cryptanalysis. Preliminary analysis, did 
however suggest low computational overhead. Recent work [48] has also considered ways to protect the privacy information of 
individuals. One-way anonymity can be preserved is through a group signature mechanism and these mechanisms can be made 
flexible from a server’s perspective. In [48], they are also made more flexible from the user’s perspective. 
The authors of [49] proposed an entropy-coding stage SE scheme that avoided affecting syntax elements which potentially 
might be manipulated by encryption. For example: splicing of video is suggests that Network Abstraction Layer (NAL) headers 
cannot be encrypted; motion information bits affect no-reference quality assessment [50]; compression domain insertion of 
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watermarks [51] may be affected; and more specifically to the current paper, certain forms of compression domain transcoding 
[52] can be impacted.  In fact, the possibility of combining more than one compression domain process, such as transcoding, 
watermarking, and encryption needs to be considered [51] [53]. In [49], no choice of syntax elements for SE is made but the trade-
off between increase in bitrate for the same video quality and increase in confidentiality or security in general is analysed.   For 
example, the impact of encrypting Sample Adaptive Offset (SAO) filtering parameters has very limited effect on the bitrate but 
can be thwarted if this form of in-loop filtering is turned off at the encoder.  
In [54], the implementation of a symmetric transcoder which incorporates SE and is suitable for smartphones. By symmetric is 
meant that the transcoder will encrypt video output from an encoder or decrypt video arriving in encrypted form, similar to a 
cascaded transcoder. By selecting syntax elements that bypass context modelling at the entropy stage, as also used by prior SE 
schemes, the scheme avoids an increase in the bitrate even though SE has been applied. Because confidentiality may be weakened 
by only choosing bypass CABAC syntax elements in [55], the authors analyse the trade-offs if non-bypass (regular mode) elements 
are chosen. By choosing to encrypt the intra prediction modes used, the confidentiality is significantly improved. As in [54] 
ciphering is embedded in the transcoder rather than the encoder to avoid the need to make SE encoder dependent. In a similar way, 
the decoder is made independent of decryption, which is performed in the transcoder. However, this appears to leave the video 
exposed if the symmetric transcoder is place in an intermediate network middlebox. Recently, [56] provides another analysis of 
CABAC syntax elements suitable for encryption, choosing the coeff_abs_level_remaining element. However, it is unclear what 
the impact on decoder format compatibility or bitrate overhead is or whether other elements could also be selected.   
HEVC tiles allow a video sequence to be decomposed into autonomous rectangular areas. In the SE option of [57], the authors 
examined Region-of-Interest (RoI) encryption of tiles. It was found that this implied that motion vectors from non-encrypted tiles 
should not reference encrypted tiles. The result was some loss of rate-distortion performance to achieve RoI SE.  However, 
propagation of encryption outside encrypted tiles was avoided.  
Thomas al. [58] considered various secure transcoder systems according to the aims of the system. For example, if the transcoder 
only works on inter-coded frames (P- and B-frames) in the interests of accelerating transcoding, If full encryption of I-frames 
occurs then the Cascaded Pixel Domain Transcoder (CPDT) form of transcoding is handicapped by the lack of I-frame data, which 
the authors address by modifying the CPDT transcoder. SE, rather than full encryption, may also be performed only on intra-coded 
frames. However if traditional sign-bit encryption is performed then error drift through lack of synchronization between encoder 
and decoder can occur. Again the authors of [58] suggest a modified sign-bit encryption scheme to restore synchronization.  
In [59], new ways of transcoding in the face of HEVC’s quad-tree block structures are considered.  Basically the proposed 
solution focuses on reducing the coding options employed. An implemented transcoder resulted in 80% less time for the 
transcoding process as compared to a conventional cascaded encoder decoder, see Fig. 1, but the coding performance reduced by 
up to 5%. In [60], computational scalable video transrating was investigated because of the high computation cost of HEVC 
cascaded transcoding. In this technique, information from the input bitstream prior to transrating was used to reduce the 
computation after bitrate scaling. This was done by altering the CU and PU structures so that the number of RD evaluations was 
reduced. Two methods of reducing subsequent computation were considered, namely top to bottom (T2B), bottom to top (B2T) 
processing of the CU structure. Machine learning techniques aided in this process. Furthermore, PUs were also reduced in number 
by manipulating information from the input stream. 
Because with the advent of HEVC, H.264/AVC standard compressed content may need to be converted to the new standard 
and in [61] [62] fast transcoders have emerged. However, because this paper is concerned with transrating rather than format 
transcoding, these transcoder designs are not considered further herein. Because also there is concern over the computation 
overhead from using HEVC standardized codecs, there have been numerous proposals as to how to reduce that overhead, such as 
[63]–[68]. However, these are outside the scope of the present work.  
In the view of the authors of [69], conventional encryption methods, such as full encryption by AES, are unsuitable for video 
data because of the computational overhead, even though major encryption providers such as Verimatrix & Widevine use AES 
encryption for satellite systems. The approach of [69] was to design a wavelet-based hardware codec that is made amenable to 
encryption, though in commercial usage, the lack of standardization. In [70], a hardware-based, cellular automata method of 
encryption was proposed. Because the application was video surveillance, RoIs can be selected, reducing the computational 
overhead further. However, possible loss of compression efficiency caused by the need to treat encrypted RoIs separately and the 
risk from applying encryption to a limited area does not seem to have been checked. Nonetheless, the method is suitable for 
lightweight encryption of video collected in an Internet of Things (IoT) video surveillance setting and presented an alternative, 
lightweight method to the SE of this paper. In the context of IoT-based video surveillance, in [71] only key frames were encrypted 
with a chaotic encryption scheme. However, the weakness of some tests used to justify the security of such chaotic encryption 
schemes was questioned in [23], as was the relative encryption speed compared to conventional block-based encryption methods. 
Instead, the authors of [72], for a secure but lightweight IoT-based video streaming scheme, preferred to employ conventional 
block-based encryption. However, they reduced the message overhead through a lightweight transport-layer protocol into which 
they inserted a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) authentication field. All the same, SE, as presented in the 
current paper, remains an effective lightweight encryption method, with advantages of lightweight chaos-based encryption. As 
developed in the current paper, it also supports intermediate processing, such as the transrating analysed herein. 
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4 Methodology 
To remove error drift from the video stream, transcoding was by means of the closed-loop architecture of Table 1. Fig. 3 is a 
block diagram of the closed-loop architecture, i.e. presented for a generic transrater. We have proposed and implemented the 
crypto-transcoder in a closed-loop architecture. Therefore, it is worthwhile to explain this architecture here for newcomers to the 
field. The input bitstream, Rin, is first variable-length decoded (vld), allowing the embedded MB motion vectors (MVs) to be 
extracted. Inverse quantization, q-1, of the residual transform coefficients then takes place using a QP, q1, originally used by the 
encoder and placed in the compressed bitstream. A control, ctrl, places a desired new QP, q2, ready for re-quantization before 
placing the residual coefficients within the output bitstream, Rout. The output bitstream is produced by variable length coding, vlc, 
that is using some form of entropy coding such as CABAC or CAVLC.  However, prior to output of the bitsream, the process of 
motion compensation (MC), takes place based on the stored reference frame(s), which are adjusted for the changed QP. To do this 
requires spatial-frequency transforming motion-compensated MBs to allow partial synchronization at the decoder for the effect of 
transcoding at a different QP to the one originally used at the encoder. Thus the motion-compensation loop of Fig. 3, is the closed 
loop that gives this type of transcoder its name. Also shown in Fig. 3 is the path taken at an end decoder to retrieve the video.  
Because the computation involved in a closed-loop architecture transcoder is already substantial, it is unwise to increase the 
computation further by requiring decryption and re-encryption. From Fig. 3, it is apparent, that if multiple representations at 
different bitrates are to be generated, (say) for HAS, then motion information and de-quantized information from the decoder can 
be extracted once and those inputs to the encoder can be repeatedly used in the encoder, thus saving on computation.  It should 
also be noticed that if the source bitstream was not already encrypted, e.g. not part of an encrypted bitstream delivered to a 
middlebox or cloud data-center, then the output could be selectively encrypted at the Variable Length Coding (VLC) stage of Fig. 
3. In Fig. 3 DCT is used for Discrete Cosine Transform and IDCT is its inverse. 
 
Fig. 3 Closed loop architecture of transcoders 
During motion compensation, typically, each 16 × 16-pixel MB is split up into 4 × 4 pixel blocks in H.264/AVC, while into 8 
× 8 pixel blocks in HEVC. (In some cases in HEVC, an 8 × 8 pixel block is further split into 4 × 8 and 8 × 4 pixel block sizes as 
well.) After the decoding of each frame (and before moving on to the next frame) the Motion Vector (MV) parameters, being the 
vector components (MVx, MVy) and a pointer(s) to the reference frame (s) used, are extracted. These parameters define the motion 
compensation for each smallest possible block. To encode and encrypt the bitstream at a number of different QP levels, the stepwise 
procedure of the proposed scheme is described below and in Fig. 4, for the example case of crypto-transcoding to a set of QPs. 
The adopted algorithm shown in Fig. 4 assumes that the video is initially encoded at QP = 12, and then transcoded to a set of lower 
quality video streams, with QP = 24, 36, and 48, given that the range of QPs for H.264/AVC and HEVC is 0–51. In Fig. 4 ME 
represents motion estimation. 
 
Step 1: Encode the raw video with the proposed H.264/HEVC crypto-entropy coder (modified CABAC) along with quantization 
at the initial QP value, herein QP = 12. Encrypt the selected parameters, i.e. signs of MVD and signs of residual texture 
information (TCs) of the outgoing H.264/HEVC bitstream. 
Step 2: In the H.264/HEVC decoder, for every compressed H.264/HEVC encoded bitstream, the horizontal MVx and vertical 
MVy, along with a pointer(s) to the reference frame(s) used, are extracted from the smallest possible block of the 
q
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H.264/HEVC bitstream and stored separately in a file. The decoding process is performed without decryption of any 
parameters and, thus, without the need to supply a key. 
Step 3: Perform crypto-transcoding with the new QP value but without decryption of the video bitstream, according to the closed-
loop architecture of Fig. 3. If necessary, repeat transcoding with one or more different QPs with the same extracted MV 
parameters from step 2. 
 Step 4: At the receiving end, the received video sequences after decryption and decoding will be able to be watched. Decoding 
with decryption follows the lower path shown in Fig. 4. (The optional verification step is added for clarity of understanding 
the whole scheme.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Stepwise flow diagram of the proposed crypto-transcoding scheme 
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5 Evaluation 
To perform experiments, H.264/AVC reference software JM 18.6 [73] and HEVC reference software HM-15.0 [74] were 
selected. The machine used for all the experiments was an Intel Core i3 Core 2 Duo (2.10 GHz) processor, with 6 GB RAM and 
Microsoft Windows 8.1 Professional installed as the operating system. Transcoding on this machine was conducted with the closed-
loop architecture of presented in Fig 4. As described in Section 1, video content for HAS can be transcoded into a number of 
qualities, which in turn determine the bitrate of the different representations available to a client by selecting from a manifest file. 
The quantization parameter (QP) normally determines the extent of compression (necessary to make bandwidth consumption 
manageable), which also impacts on the processing required at the target device. This assumes that Variable Bit Rate (VBR) video 
content is presented to the transcoder, with the result that constant quality representations result. Constant Bit Rate (CBR) video, 
although it allows video storage to be planned has a disadvantage during transmission because if the content, for a given quality, 
does not require its bitrate then bandwidth wastage occurs. The well-known FFmpeg software, depending on the underlying 
encoder selected, allows constrained VBR to be output [75], avoiding a risk of a video stream temporally exceeding its average 
bitrate. However, in this paper for simplicity in making quality comparisons, VBR is assumed. 
 
Two reference CIF (352 × 288 pixels/frame) video sequences, i.e. Stefan and Mobile (available from http://www2.tkn.tu-
berlin.de/research/evalvid/cif.html) and an HD 720 (1280 × 720 pixels/frame) video sequence, i.e. Four People, were transcoded 
to different QPs (12, 24, 36 and 48). All tested videos are encoded with I, P and B frames with GOP of 16. A QP of 12 results in 
broadcast quality video, while if the QP is set to 48 the video is very compressed but equally the visual quality is very low in both 
an H.264/AVC and HEVC codec. Otherwise, the video configuration settings of the original test videos were retained. 
 
Fig. 5 illustrates frames from the test video sequences with calculated average Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR), an objective 
measure of video quality measured in decibels (dBs) [76], and average Structural Similarity (SSIM) index [77], which aims to 
capture the human perceptual response on a scale (usually) of 0 to 1.  
 
 
   
Stefan Video (frame # 13)  
PSNR [Y=27.9, U= 46.8, V=41.9] dB, 
SSIM = 0.9626 
Mobile Video (frame # 54)  
PSNR Y=27.7, U= 40.5, V=37.5] dB,  
SSIM = 0.9446 
 
Four People (HD 720 video) (frame # 53)  
PSNR [Y= 27.7 , U= 46.6 ,V= 54.21] dB, 
SSIM = 0.9446 
 
Fig. 5 Videos frames from the test videos (without crypto-transrating) showing PSNR and SSIM values for the luminance, Y, 
and chrominance, U and V, components 
 
The above video sequences were firstly compressed by using lossless compression, by setting QP = 0, using either H.264/AVC 
or HEVC codecs. SE was applied during compression by selecting the TC and MV signs for AES encryption. Subsequently, the 
compressed versions of the sequences were transrated to different QP levels. 
The following equations were used to calculate the various quantities reported. For the bitrate reduction in going from 
H.264/AVC to HEVC: 
 
∆ 𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
(𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝐻𝐸𝑉𝐶−(𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝐴𝑉𝐶
(𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝐴𝑉𝐶
× 100     (1) 
  
For visual evaluation after SE, the PSNR and SSIM index value were returned by equations (2) and (4) respectively: 
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PSNR = 10. log10
(2x−1)2
𝑀𝑆𝐸
                                                                   (2) 
 
where MSE is the Mean Square Error between the reference video and the video of interest, with x being the bits per pixel, herein 
being eight to allow comparison between the two codecs. 
 
The PSNR difference was calculated by equation (3): 
                           ∆ 𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑅 (𝑌) =  
(𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑅𝑦)𝐻𝐸𝑉𝐶−(𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑅𝑦)𝐴𝑉𝐶
(𝑃𝑆𝑁y)𝐴𝑉𝐶
× 100             (3)   
and SSIM was calculated by equation (4): 
 
          𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀(𝑎, 𝑏) =  
(2𝜇𝑎𝜇𝑏+𝑐1)(2𝜎𝑎𝑏+𝑐2)
(𝜇𝑎
2𝜇𝑏
2+𝑐1)(𝜎𝑎
2+𝜎𝑏
2+𝑐2)
    (4) 
where a, b are the two video frames being compared, with 𝜇𝑎, 𝜇𝑏being average pixel value (intensity) within a, b respectively, with 
𝜎𝑎, 𝜎𝑏 being the variance within a,b respectively, and 𝜎𝑎𝑏 being the covariance. Two variables, c1 and c2, are introduced to stabilize 
division with relatively small denominators [77]. 
 
Encoding time difference was found by equation (5): 
 
 
∆ 𝐸𝑛𝑐. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 =  
(𝐸𝑛𝑐.  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝐻𝐸𝑉𝐶−(𝐸𝑛𝑐.  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝐴𝑉𝐶
(𝐸𝑛𝑐.  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝐴𝑉𝐶
× 100    (5) 
 
Apart from the comparison of video frame distortion by one of the two video quality metrics, PSNR and SSIM, two other 
processing steps were taken to determine the extent (or lack of distortion). The first of these was by edge-detection using a 
Laplacian filter [78] and the second of these was by pixelation [79], i.e. lowering of the resolution, of the frames. For both of these 
effects, an 8 × 8 pixel filter was applied to a video frame to obtain the effects. 
 
5.1 Crypto-transcoding with AVC and HEVC 
The results of crypto-encoding and then crypto-transrating according to the choice of codec and QP are shown and discussed in 
this Section. The results are taken according to the steps of the algorithm presented in the Methodology section (Section 4). 
From Figs. 6 and 7, the reader will see that the content of all sample video frames is distorted to a greater or lesser extent after 
applying SE (Fig. 6, 7 (a1, a2)) and then transrated shown in Figs. 6 and 7 (b1, b2, c1, c2, d1 and d2). However, there are 
conspicuous visual differences between the outputs of the both codecs. In addition, some portions of the frames remain still visible, 
such as the static calendar in Mobile and the tennis court in Stefan. This is not surprising as the calendar and tennis court are largely 
static, whereas the method of SE works on changing values of the MV signs. If there is little motion the MVD will be small and 
the impact of encrypting the signs will be small. Examining the best quality at QP = 12 and the worst at QP = 48 of the sample 
Mobile frame, it is evident that the impact of SE along with transrating is greater on lower quality video. The same is also 
particularly apparent for the same QP levels of Stefan, especially when the original encoding was with the HEVC codec. This 
effect may be related to the TC sign encryption. At higher QPs, more of the TCs are reduced to zero and, hence, do not appear in 
the input to the CABAC engine. Therefore, the effect of flipping the signs of the fewer TCs that are present may have a greater 
impact. To verify the effectiveness of the crypto-encoding along with transrating over tested videos, video structural distortion 
analysis is done with Laplacian edge detection or with the pixelate effect, as is demonstrated in Figs. 6 and 7. Notice that a recent 
way of testing the effectiveness of encryption is to apply edge detection to the distorted frame [80] and pixelation also serves to 
check the effectiveness of the encryption. 
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 Encrypted frame Laplacian edge-detection With pixelate effect 
H.264/AVC 
(a1) Step1 
Crypto-encoded 
with QP 12 
   
HEVC 
(a2) Step1 
Crypto-encoded 
with QP 12 
   
H.264/AVC 
(b1) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken 
from Step 1, 
transrated with 
QP 24 
   
HEVC 
(b2) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken 
from Step 1, 
transrated with 
QP 24 
   
H.264/AVC 
(c1) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken 
from Step 1, 
transrated with 
QP 36 
   
HEVC 
(c2) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken 
from Step 1, 
transrated with 
QP 36 
   
H.264/AVC 
(d1) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken 
from Step 1, 
transrated with 
QP 48 
   
HEVC 
(d2) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken 
from Step 1, 
transrated with 
QP 48 
   
Fig. 6 Visual results for Stefan (frame # 13) after crypt-transrating with different QPs, with edge-detection and pixelate tests 
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 Encrypted frame Laplacian edge-detection With pixelate effect 
H.264/AVC 
(a1) Step1 
Crypto-encoded 
with QP 12 
   
HEVC 
(a2) Step1 
Crypto-encoded 
with QP 12 
   
H.264/AVC 
(b1) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken 
from Step 1, 
transrated with 
QP 24 
  
 
HEVC 
(b2) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken 
from Step 1, 
transrated with 
QP 24 
   
H.264/AVC 
(c1) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken 
from Step 1, 
transrated with 
QP 36 
   
HEVC 
(c2) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken 
from Step 1, 
transrated with 
QP 36 
   
H.264/AVC 
(d1) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken 
from Step 1, 
transrated with 
QP 48 
   
HEVC 
(d2) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken 
from Step 1, 
transrated with 
QP 48 
   
Fig. 7 Visual results for Mobile (frame # 54) after crypto-transrating with different QPs, with edge-detection and pixelate tests 
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In Tables 3 and 4, it is proved from the output file sizes, HEVC encryption and subsequent transcoding generally results in 
greater compression at all QP levels. However, this comes at a cost in a considerable time spent in transrating of the encrypted 
content when HEVC is employed. From the two Tables, in PSNR terms, HEVC SE and subsequent transrating results in less 
distortion than when H.264/AVC is used. Recall that Tables 3 and 4’s PSNR results are averaged across each of the two sequences 
compared and, thus, subjective impressions from Figs. 6 and 7 may not be confirmed for individual sample frames. Distortion 
increases for HEVC in going from low QP (high quality) to high QP (low quality), though this change is the combined effect of 
lower quality video at the higher QPs and the addition of SE. A surprising result, perhaps, is that the gain from HEVC rather than 
H.264/AVC transrating of encrypted content in terms of reduced bitrate is relatively larger at lower qualities. This is perhaps 
surprising because HEVC was designed for high resolution and high quality video, which is necessary as visual artifacts are 
otherwise more apparent at higher resolutions. Comparing between Stefan and Mobile video sequences, a similar pattern of results 
is evident. However, there are greater differences in quality between the codecs for Mobile, with greater spatial complexity than 
Stefan. It is more apparent from the SSIM index results in Fig. 8 that at QP level 12, SE by the given method is unsuitable when 
an HEVC codec is used because there is insufficient distortion across the sequences. For spatially more complex Mobile as well, 
if SE is followed by transrating, HEVC processing results in reduced distortion. Therefore, there is a content-dependent and quality-
dependent effect when moving between H.264/AVC to HEVC when this type of processing takes place. 
 
Table 3 Crypto-Transrating results for the HEVC and H.264/AVC video codec with the Stefan video sequence  
QP Bit Rate 
(AVC) 
Bit Rate 
(HEVC) 
Δ Bit Rate 
(Avg. bit rate) 
PSNR_Y(dB) 
AVC 
PSNR_Y(dB) 
HEVC 
Δ PSNR (Y) 
(dB) 
Δ Enc. Time 
(ms) 
12 1670 kb 1130 kb - 32.34 % 10.01 16.19 +61.74 % +81.79 % 
24 564 kb 375 kb -33.51 % 10.65 14.03 +31.74 % +33.09 % 
36 204 kb 114 kb -44.12 % 10.48 12.83 +22.42 % +14.93 % 
48 159 kb 29 kb -81.76 % 11.02 12.58 +14.16 % +9.18 % 
 
 
Table 4 Crypto-Transrating results for the HEVC and H.264/AVC video codec with the Mobile video sequence  
QP Bit Rate 
(AVC) 
Bit Rate 
(HEVC) 
Δ Bit Rate 
(Avg. Bit-Rate) 
PSNR_Y(dB) 
AVC 
PSNR_Y(dB) 
HEVC 
Δ PSNR (Y) 
(dB) 
Δ Enc. Time 
(ms) 
12 1755 kb 1213 kb -30.88% 6.7 16.5 +146.27 % +113 % 
24 691 kb 429 kb -37.92 % 6.7 16.7 +149.25 % +82.63 % 
36 252 kb 113 kb -55.16 % 6.7 12.9 +92.54 % +61.20 % 
48 178 kb 55 kb -80.29 % 7.1 9.1 +28.17 % +34.29 % 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Fig. 8 Average SSIM values for H.264/AVC and HEVC for a) Stefan and b) Mobile crypto-transrated videos 
5.2 HEVC encoded Crypto-transrating with XOR and AES ciphers 
The performance of crypto-transcoding with an XOR cipher is tested with H.264/HEVC encoders in Section 5.1 and presented 
in Figs. 6 and 7. In this Section, transrating after encryption with the state-of-the-art AES cipher is also tested.  Fig. 9 shows the 
visual results of crypto-transrating with the two implemented ciphers i.e. XOR and AES, operating over the same syntax elements 
and encoded with the HEVC encoder on the HD720 Four People video. AES has many modes of operation. In the Cipher Feedback 
mode (CFB), AES works as a stream-cipher [28] and additionally benefits from a self-synchronization mechanism for real-time 
transmission. The visual results (from frame no. 53) indicate that the encryption performed using AES-CFB produces a strongly 
distorted frame, whereas applying an XOR operation results in insufficient distortion. Histogram analysis applied to crypto-
transrated video with the two said ciphers is presented in Fig. 10. Fig. 10 contains histograms of the red, green, blue and luminance 
values of each pixel of the tested video sequence. This Fig. 10 (c, e) indicates that the AES-CFB cipher results in an increase in 
entropy or randomness across the pixel values relative to using the XOR cipher. This entropy is evident in the spreading of more 
black and sharp colours across the video frames compared to the original histogram values prior to crypto-transrating of the Four 
12 24 36 48
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People video, Fig.10 (a). This finding implies that, if the videos are selectively encrypted by AES, it is difficult to infer the presence 
of an object in any one of the R, G, B and luminance domains.    
 
 Results taken through XOR cipher Results taken through AES (CFB) 
(a) Step 1 
 SE with crypto-
encoder at QP 12 
 
  
(b) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken from 
Step 1, transrated 
with QP 24 
  
(c) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken from 
Step 1, transrated 
with QP 36 
  
(d) Step 3 
Crypto-encoded 
video taken from 
Step 1, transrated 
with QP 48 
  
Fig. 9 Visual results for Four People (frame #53) after crypto-transrating through XOR and AES ciphers   
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(a) RGB histograms & luminance histogram of original frame 
    
(b) RGB histograms & luminance histograms of video encrypted with XOR at QP 12 
    
(c) RGB histograms & luminance histogram of video encrypted with AES (CFB) at QP 12 
    
(d) RGB histograms & luminance histograms of video encrypted with XOR and then transrated with QP 48 
    
(e) RGB histograms & luminance histograms of video encrypted with AES (CFB) and then transrated with QP 48 
 
Fig. 10 Histogram analysis of Four People video after crypto-transrating with XOR and AES ciphers and encoding 
with an HEVC encoder 
5.3 Comparative analysis 
Table 5 is an analysis comparing the scheme described with previous secure transcoders. The crypto-transcoder has advantages 
over previously proposed schemes in [15], [54] and [58], though to some extent these are more to do with the development of the 
HEVC codec than merits of prior schemes. The proposed crypto-transcoder scheme provides a greater compression rate due to the 
possible use of an HEVC codec, as well as preserving the whole video structure at transcoders. The proposed scheme also 
implements real-time transcoding as the authors did in [15] and [54]. Meanwhile, when H.264/AVC is targeted, the computational 
overhead in terms of encryption with transcoding time appears to be lower than the schemes proposed in [15], [54], and [58]. 
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Table 5 Comparison with some previous secure transcoding schemes 
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper implemented a joint crypto-transcoder with two widely deployed video codecs, H.264/AVC and HEVC. 
The main contribution has been to reduce the processing latency at intermediate transcoders arising from a need to encrypt 
video for reasons of content protection and possibly privacy protection at the user. The paper proposes that a suitable 
selective-encryption scheme is applied in that the encrypted video bitstream remains decoder format compatible. Because 
the selective encryption on carefully selected bin-strings reduces the computational overhead of encryption, there is a further 
gain, apart from the desired reduction in latency, in terms of an overall bitrate reduction. The experiments performed have 
shown that transcoding of HEVC video produces better results in terms of reduced file sizes. However, if one considers the 
computation cost of performing joint crypto-transcoding, then HEVC results in greater transcoding times. Therefore, if 
transcoding is likely to be used then it is better to use SE rather than full encryption, unless the application is (say) military, 
legal, or medical. From experiments, the gains from using SE are substantial in terms of limited bitrate overhead and 
(according to the machine employed) several seconds saved in encoding alone, even for short video sequences. For longer 
video streams, including broadcast TV and films, the savings in bit-rate and computation time will be considerable. If 
reduced bandwidth is not a priority then the H.264/AVC codec remains viable, unless a hardware HEVC codec is available. 
From comparisons of visual distortion in the paper, it is apparent that there is a content dependency and QP-dependency 
when transrating to lower bitrates, in the sense that SE may contribute reduced distortion at higher bitrates. In going from 
H.264/AVC to HEVC, it is also likely that there will be less distortion at the same QP. In fact, it may be better to avoid 
HEVC joint crypto-transcoding at the lowest QPs, i.e. for broadcast-quality video. The paper also considers whether a low-
complexity cypher is worth considering because of a further reduction in latency at the server and client ends.  However, 
from cipher comparisons between AES and XOR encryption of the selected elements in the video stream, XOR appears 
insufficient, despite interest in lightweight encryption using XOR for smart grid applications.  
Future work will consider how to select suitable syntax elements according to the type of content and the expected 
transcoded quality. The aim will be to distort those features of a video frame that some encrypted syntax elements do not 
presently have an impact upon. In that sense, an intelligent SE scheme will adaptively apply encryption to elements within 
the compressed video stream. At the same time, any such system should preserve decoder format compatibility and 
minimize any increase in bitrate.  There is also scope for performing a number of other statistical tests to confirm the results, 
such as through correlation-coefficient analysis as an alternative to histogram analysis, and finding the video encryption 
quantity as an alternative way to investigate the QP-dependency of encryption. Rate-distortion analysis, such as through 
the well-known Bjøntegaard-Delta metric, is an alternative way of examining the bitrate overhead from encryption. 
 
Parameters for 
comparison 
(Díaz-Sánchez et al. 
2016) [15] 
(Boyadjis et al. 
2014) [54] 
(Thomas et al. 2010) 
[58] 
Proposed crypto-
transcoder scheme 
Video structure 
preservation at 
decoder 
Yes: Full encryption 
produced the actual video 
structure at decoder. 
Yes: Preserved the 
video format with no 
bit-rate overhead 
Yes: Preserved the 
cipher synchronization 
with no loss of 
compression 
performance at decoder 
Yes: The scheme 
provides a greater 
compression rate, as 
well as preserving the 
video structure at the 
decoder 
Real-time 
transcoding 
Yes, by sharing load on 
multiple machines 
Yes No Yes 
Codec standard H.264/ SVC H.264/AVC and 
HEVC 
H.264/AVC Hybrid model: works 
both for H.264/AVC and 
HEVC 
Encryption type Full encryption: It 
proposed a distributed 
encryption and flexible 
key management, which 
facilitates content 
filtering, key extraction 
and content decryption at 
the receiver  
Selective 
Encryption was 
based on symmetric 
ciphering and 
managed by AES 
Introduced two methods 
of SE: 
1. On the basis of full I 
frame encryption; and  
2. On the basis of sign 
bits of motion vectors 
and transform 
coefficients 
SE based on the 
arithmetic signs of 
motion vectors 
difference and the signs 
of texture data (TC) 
Computational 
overhead 
High due to full 
encryption. 
Low High in scheme 1. 
Low in scheme 2 but 
produced error drift after 
transcoding 
Low for H.264/AVC, 
medium for HEVC due 
to video encoding time 
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